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   * * * 
MS. FEINSTEIN:  I’m really thrilled to be 
moderating this panel, although I don’t think the 
moderating job will be much work.  I could really just 
say “interesting topics in merger enforcement, 
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discuss” and this group could probably go for half a 
day.  But I’ll try to keep it a little organized. 
Let me first start with the introductions.  
To my far left is Howard Shelanski of Davis Polk and 
Georgetown University Law School.  Next to him from 
the European Union is Carles Esteva Mosso, who is the 
Deputy Director General at the EU Commission.  Next to 
me is Bruce Hoffman, the Director of the Bureau of 
Competition at the FTC.  To my right is John Davies, a 
Partner at Freshfields. 
We are going to start off with a variety of 
topics.  We’ll try to leave a little bit of time at 
the end for questions. 
Bruce, let me start with you.  Cases are 
often brought on unilateral effects and there have 
been questions about whether or not there has been a 
resurgence in coordinated action theories in merger 
enforcement.  Did it ever really go away?  I wonder 
what your perspective is on how often that coordinated 
interaction arises in cases in the United States. 
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MR. HOFFMAN:  Thanks, Debbie.  Let me start 
by saying a couple of things.  
First I’ll give the standard disclaimer that 
anything I say doesn’t necessarily reflect the view of 
the Commission or any Commissioner or the Bureau of 
Competition or anybody. 
I also wanted to note, following up on 
Commissioner Ohlhausen’s talk a few minutes ago, I 
want to thank her for hiring me as Acting Bureau 
Director, and of course to the current Commission for 
making me Bureau Director.  But I wanted to note how 
much of a privilege it was to serve under Acting 
Chairman Ohlhausen and to reiterate some of the things 
she said about the activity of the Commission during 
her tenure there.  I think it was a really exciting 
and interesting time at the Commission, for obvious 
reasons, but also a very and successful one, as she 
noted.  Some of the things that we’re going to talk 
about today — many of them actually — had their 
genesis in that period. 
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Also, knowing that Debbie is going to be 
moderating, I brought an entire book of things that I 
could say in response to the questions I might get.  
My first plan was to just read all this out to 
everybody, but I decided that wouldn’t be a lot of 
fun, so I’m not going to do that. 
On coordinated interaction, first of all, 
has it ever gone away or is there a resurgence?  I 
would say it has never gone away and it’s unclear to 
me that there is a resurgence, but certainly it’s an 
issue that’s a live issue and something that we think 
about quite a lot. 
I think as a number of folks here know, and 
as Commissioner Ohlhausen mentioned earlier, two days 
ago we won a preliminary injunction in a merger case 
the primary theory of which was coordinated 
interaction.  Now, the decision on that is not yet 
public.  It will be coming out.  It is going through 
the usual redaction of confidential information 
process.  When that decision comes out I think it will 
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have some things to say about this topic. 
But I would say this on coordinated 
interaction.  I think it would be fair to say that 
while it’s something that we look at a lot, it’s 
probably not alleged as frequently as unilateral 
effects in the investigative stage and when we 
ultimately go to remedies it’s not as common. 
I did some casual empiricism on this.  One 
of the things I noted was since 1996 the FTC has 
litigated twenty-five preliminary injunctions to 
decision, and out of those eight of them involved 
coordinated interaction theories. 
Out of those twenty-five cases also the 
FTC’s win/loss record is eighteen wins and seven 
losses.  But its win/loss record in the cases where 
coordinated interaction was alleged is five wins and 
three losses.  Now, there’s a law of small numbers 
problem here, but certainly statistically that shows a 
higher loss rate where you’re bringing a coordinated 
interaction case. 
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When you’re thinking about these theories 
that obviously could suggest some cautionary notes 
when you’re considering is this a viable case to 
challenge; is there a viable theory here that we have 
that we could persuade a court to block a merger on? 
I think part of the reason for that is there 
are some inherent difficulties with coordination — not 
so much in terms of the way we think about it 
necessarily, but in terms of how the thinking about 
coordinated theories might translate to courts.  I’ll 
give you three examples of that. 
The first is I think some courts struggle 
with the distinction between price fixing, an actual 
anticompetitive agreement, and coordinated 
interaction.  So they tend to sometimes think:  Well, 
if the merger isn’t going to allow people to actually 
fix prices, if they’re not going to get in a backroom 
somewhere and fix prices, then it can’t be a problem.  
Whereas I think our view of coordinate 
interaction — certainly the Guidelines are clear on 
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this — is what we’re concerned about primarily are 
cases where that’s exactly what’s not going to happen.  
If people do that, if they get in a room and fix 
prices, then the Department of Justice is going to go 
and put them in jail.  So we’re not as worried about 
the conduct that is going to put you in jail.  What 
we’re worried about is a merger that is going to allow 
you to achieve a similar outcome without doing 
something that’s going to put you in jail because 
there’s no obvious solution to that problem once you 
have allowed it to come into being. 
But I think courts struggle sometimes with 
price fixing (Sherman Act Section 1) versus Clayton 
Act Section 7 coordinated interaction, and they think 
if you can’t show the one then you can’t show the 
other. 
Second, I think courts can struggle with the 
complexity of some of the models that are out there 
for coordinated interaction.  For example, the kind of 
canonical Cournot model which you might use to predict 
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coordinated effects produces some results that a court 
might find counterintuitive, such as if you run a 
basic Cournot model what it will show is that a lot of 
mergers are just unprofitable on their face if you 
look at variable costs.   
So then you can go to the judge and say, 
“Well, the model they’re using would say that this 
entire merger is unprofitable.  If that were true we 
wouldn’t do it.  Therefore, the model has got to be 
wrong.”  That’s a challenging thing for a district 
court judge to try to figure out. 
Third, in cases where you bring a 
coordinated interaction theory, you might as a matter 
of general assumption believe that those markets are 
inherently likely to be less concentrated.  By the 
way, that’s not necessarily the case, but certainly 
there would be a lot of scenarios where a coordinated 
interaction case might involve five-to-four mergers, 
those sorts of things, where there’s some reason to 
think that the structure of the market will facilitate 
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coordination afterwards, but your Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI) numbers are going to be lower, and so you 
may be further away from the thresholds that have been 
established to get presumptions and so forth, and so 
there is an inherent challenge from a litigation 
standpoint there.  
MS. FEINSTEIN:  Carles, what’s your 
perspective?  Does coordinated interaction come up a 
lot in cases in Europe? 
MR. ESTEVA:  I think the term you used 
before, resurgence, is a good one to describe the 
situation in the European Union.  After the judgment 
of the Court in Airtours in 2002 we saw really very 
few cases being brought on the basis of coordinated 
effects in Europe.   
I think probably there are two explanations 
for this.  First, the high bar that the judgment set 
up for this type of cases.  Also the fact that after 
the change of the test in our Regulation in 2004 we 
have more flexibility to use unilateral effects to 
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look at issues in oligopolistic markets.  
In the last few years we have seen a number 
of cases being brought on the basis of coordination, 
very often on the top of unilateral effects concerns. 
This can be explained first by a renewed focus of the 
Commission on coordinated effects, but also by the 
availability of different types of evidence and in 
particular on internal documents.  None of these cases 
have reached the Court.  One was abandoned and the 
others have been solved by remedies.  But I’m 
confident that in all these cases we would have 
convinced the Court that the Airtours criteria were 
met. 
A good example of this type of concerns has 
come up in mobile telephony cases.  As Andrea 
mentioned, we have been busy challenging a number of 
four-to-three mergers in mobile telephony in Europe, 
and in some of them on top of unilateral effects we 
could establish also coordinated issues.   
The Italian case is a good example.  After 
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the merger there would have been a market structure 
with three players, three network operators, with very 
symmetrical market shares, very symmetrical cost 
structures.  The merger would have eliminated the 
company that had played more a maverick role in this 
area.  On top of this, through internal documents we 
could identify that in the past there had been very 
clear attempts at coordination on this market and 
after the merger these attempts could become much more 
successful. 
Here the focal point of coordination would 
have not been pricing.  In mobile telephony you have 
very different pricing offers that make them difficult 
to compare.  But, on the contrary, it would have been 
easier to coordinate on the basis of the market shares 
of the parties.  
One last point on this case. This is the 
first case in mobile telephony that was resolved with 
a structural remedy. Through a divestiture of a number 
of assets - spectrum communication towers and 
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communication equipment — we facilitated the entry of 
a fourth network operator with incentives to behave 
quite aggressively in the first years.  Actually, what 
we have seen is the entry of Iliad, the fourth player 
in France, who had successfully challenged the 
incumbent operators in mobile telephony in France. 
They announced their launch at the end of May and in 
July they had already more than a million subscribers.  
I think that this remedy is proving a successful one 
to restore competition and maybe even to go further 
than the level of competition that we had premerger. 
MS. FEINSTEIN:  John, is it your sense that 
when advising clients there is good guidance about 
when the European Commission is likely to look at 
coordinated interaction and what arguments they will 
accept in deciding that coordinated actions are 
unlikely, or is there some lack of clarity about that 
issue? 
MR. DAVIES:  It’s a really important and 
difficult question.  I think my role on the panel is 
 13 
 
 
 
 
Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.       
to give a view as a practitioner.   
Carles referred to resurgence in cases.  He 
kindly didn’t mention one case that he’ll remember we 
had a discussion once, which was the AB 
InBev/SABMiller global beer merger, where the 
Commission identified a risk of tacit collusion.  It 
was resolved in Phase I with some extensive remedies.  
I recall Carles saying to me what he just said, which 
was he was confident that he would be able to find a 
resolution if it had to go all the way.  Obviously, 
when you’re dealing with one of those cases you have 
to make some judgment calls about whether you wish to 
challenge that or not. 
But I think there is a point there for the 
Commission.  We’re still talking about a small number 
of cases.  Apart from the beer case, there was a small 
number of telecom cases.  I think that the Commission 
has to be very thoughtful, particularly when it is 
looking at internal documents, because in the 
particular matter I was referring to I think that we 
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had a somewhat different view as to what the relevance 
of those documents were.  We didn’t get the 
opportunity to discuss it more carefully. 
It’s quite interesting what Bruce said in 
his opening comments about in the United States the 
relative likelihood of success before a judge in 
coordinated cases. 
Going back to your question, I think it’s 
very difficult to be able to give reliable and 
consistent advice to clients, particularly if, for 
example, you are not able to assess the documents 
beforehand.  Very often, at least in the European 
Union, it is very difficult to get your clients to 
allow you to review all the documents beforehand so 
you can help make a judgment on that particular 
aspect.  You may have a better view on the market 
conditions which might give rise to coordination. 
Personally, as a practicing lawyer, I do 
find it very difficult to be able to make reliable 
judgments, and I’m hoping that the resurgence is 
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limited. 
MS. FEINSTEIN:  Howard, at a simplistic 
level unilateral effects theory assumes that the 
merged firm can raise prices even if nobody else 
follows, whereas coordinated interaction assumes that 
everybody will raise prices, they’ll be able to work 
together.  You sometimes see cases where both theories 
are alleged.  Do you think there is conflict and 
tension, or can both theories coexist together? 
MR. SHELANSKI:  That’s a great question.  I 
do not think that there’s a tension necessarily 
between a coordinated and a unilateral effects theory.  
I think that it will depend very much on the facts and 
circumstances, but there are many such cases where 
both can very consistently and clearly be raised. 
I’ll give you an example.  If you are 
looking at a merger between two close competitors in a 
differentiated product market, you would naturally 
start to think about a unilateral effects theory.  But 
lots of things happen in terms of repositioning, how 
 16 
 
 
 
 
Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.       
you might move the acquired firm’s products closer to 
the buying firm’s products, leaving the remaining 
firms in a market frankly in a better position to 
engage in coordinated interaction amongst themselves 
because they may be more closely aligned with each 
other in terms of the kinds of products they’re 
putting out there in the market, and what was 
disrupting their coordination could have been the 
acquired firm that in terms of the product space lies 
between them and the buying firm. 
So what you have is unilateral effects 
between the buyer and the target — they’ll raise 
price, differentiate maybe even further.  The other 
firms are less concerned about the intermediately 
located firm disrupting their market and they are in a 
better position to have coordinated effects.   
You then wind up with a market that has both 
unilateral effects and coordinated effects post-
merger.  That’s just one of many scenarios one could 
come up with. 
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I think the 2010 Guidelines made clear that 
these were not alternative theories, that these were 
theories that could both be brought.  So I don’t think 
there’s a necessary tension. 
The only other thing I want to add generally 
on coordinated effects is I just think historically 
it’s sort of remarkable that we’re here asking the 
question “Do coordinated effects matter?”  If you just 
go back to, say, the period from the mid-1980s to the 
mid-1990s, go back to Hospital Corporation of America 
and Judge Posner writing that “the sine qua non of all 
merger enforcement is collusion and coordinated 
effects.” 
So what happened?  Why are we now in a 
position where coordinated effects theories succeed 
less often, seem less front and center, and we more 
often bring unilateral effects?  I think that’s a very 
interesting story. 
I would just note that I think what happened 
was intuition ran ahead of theory back in the older 
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days; there was a strong intuition that we could 
understand collusion.  But then there was a whole lot 
of research that showed the conditions under which 
collusion can hold are actually relatively slim.  So 
we saw coordinated effects going out of fashion. 
When they came back into the 2010 Merger 
Guidelines, it was a case of theory getting ahead of 
intuition.  What we said in the 2010 Guidelines was 
tacit collusion is okay; you should think about kinds 
of coordination beyond collusion.  That is, as I think 
Bruce said, kind of a hard thing for courts to grasp, 
it’s kind of counterintuitive, and so we are kind of 
at this point now where we are trying to bring back a 
more sophisticated form of coordinated effects, and I 
think it’s a difficult thing to prove. 
MR. HOFFMAN:  Can I add a couple of things 
to that? 
One, a good example in some ways of the 
point that Howard just made coordination, where you 
have a unilateral and a coordinated theory, and it has 
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to do with repositioning to a certain extent, is 
CDK/Auto/Mate.  
You had a market there with two very large 
competitors and then several smaller competitors.  One 
possible issue that could arise is the small 
competitor would not only eliminate a nascent rival, 
an innovative rival, as Commissioner Olhausen talked 
about, but also one that presented a real threat to 
the possibility of coordination between the two larger 
existing firms. 
Another example where you could have these 
theories fall out in the same case: If you look at the 
complaint in the Tronox case, there are coordinated 
effects theories, as I mentioned earlier, and there is 
also a unilateral theory having to do with unilateral 
capacity reductions.  The intuition behind that is 
simply it’s a “have your cake and eat it too” type 
scenario, where it’s unilaterally profitable for the 
merged firm, under the assumptions and what we 
alleged, to reduce its output or to produce less post-
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merger than otherwise the firms would independently.  
It would be profitable for the merged firm even if the 
other firms responded by increasing their output, but 
it would be even more profitable for everybody if they 
didn’t, if they chose to withhold output.  Those 
things are not inherently in tension.  There is good 
reason to think that this can actually happen. 
But I also do think this issue about 
collusion versus coordination, as I mentioned, is one 
the courts have struggled with.  If you think back, 
Arch Coal is an example of this.  In Arch Coal I think 
the court struggled with this issue.  Also again, as 
part of sometimes theory running ahead of maybe at 
least the courts if not the facts, in that case the 
court said the FTC is pursuing this novel theory that 
the firms are going to coordinate on output as opposed 
to price.  I just remember reading that and thinking 
This is not a novel theory.  In fact, in half of the 
price-fixing cases out there is actually coordination 
on production because that’s a heck of a lot easier to 
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monitor and enforce than price collusion, which is 
actually often quite difficult to monitor.  
So there are a lot of strange things about 
that decision, but I think it underscores that these 
kinds of theories are sometimes less intuitively easy 
to grasp than the unilateral effects theory, which is 
if you have a firm that ends up really large, as is 
the case in most of those, people intuitively get the 
idea that that could be a problem. 
MS. FEINSTEIN:  I also think there might be 
something in the fact that the economic tools to 
determine whether unilateral effects are likely and 
the amount of data we have resulted in the increased 
use of unilateral effects theory. For example, you can 
now use scanner data to determine what is likely to 
happen with retail pricing in a merger.   
Often when I was at the Commission and I 
would talk to economists, they would say, “Okay, the 
theory here is that coordinated interaction is going 
to occur because the two companies are now going to 
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look more like each other.” 
You go, “Okay, great.  How do I demonstrate 
that?”  There’s silence in the room because you just 
don’t have the same economic tools to show that the 
way you do unilateral effects.  I don’t know if others 
agree, but I think that may be some of it. 
MR. HOFFMAN:  I completely agree with that.  
I mentioned earlier that one of the problems is basic 
Cournot models and some of the outputs that they 
generate when you run them through. 
But also, if you think about what is the 
model that’s in the Guidelines that talk a lot about 
coordinated interaction?  It talks about the plus 
factors and so forth and the caselaw on collusion.  
And then you look at subsequent developments 
on that, and there is literature — Bill Kovacic has 
written about it, and Leslie Marx and some others — on 
plus factors and super-plus factors and how some of 
these plus factors really are almost totally 
irrelevant.  Others appear to be highly predictive, or 
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at least more or less predictive.  There’s just a lot 
of difficulty. 
With some of the basic models you run you 
get very different outputs for coordination if you 
assume differentiated products in Bertrand versus 
Cournot, and then when you’re trying to explain that 
to a judge it could be really challenging. 
MS. FRIEDMAN:  Great. 
Let us turn for a minute now to vertical 
mergers.  They have certainly been in the news in the 
United States, largely because of one case.  There was 
a litigated merger this year, which hadn’t happened in 
fifty years, where one had actually gone to court.  
There had certainly been challenges, mergers that 
didn’t occur or where there were consent decrees.  And 
certainly vertical merger enforcement is nothing new 
at all in the European Commission, and they have put 
out quite clear guidelines on the issue. 
Howard, are vertical mergers getting more in 
the news because there are more of them; and, if so, 
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why?  Or is this just a blip because one of them 
actually went to court?  What’s your perspective on 
that? 
MR. SHELANSKI:  I think it is a mix of 
things.  I do think that the AT&T/Time Warner case 
going to court was a dramatic development because it 
was unexpected.  It looked like we were going to run 
the playbook of a deal that had happened just seven 
years before and that had resulted in elaborate but 
fairly routine kind of conduct remedies.  I think 
that’s what was expected.   
As a theoretical matter about the theories 
of harm, there was really nothing terribly novel about 
the AT&T/Time Warner case.  One way to look at what 
was happening is that the whole litigation was driven 
by a new theory of remedy, a theory of what works as 
remedies and some experience with previous remedies 
that at least some allege might not have worked very 
well; and also just an intellectual commitment to not 
having antitrust agencies become long-term regulators 
 25 
 
 
 
 
Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.       
and overseers of a firm or an industry, so a 
preference for structural. 
When an impasse was reached everybody wound 
up in court.  We could say that this was sort of a 
one-off or driven not so much by a theory of harm 
difference but by a remedial difference, but I do 
think there’s something else going on here.   
There were certain ways we always used to 
look at vertical mergers and certain efficiencies and 
benefits of vertical mergers that were really taken as 
given.  So the elimination of double marginalization, 
which is to say the reduction of a level of profit 
taking in the vertical chain that would happen through 
the merger was usually taken in every model would 
suggest as a good thing.  So the sort of implicit 
credit that you would give a vertical merger for 
bringing efficiencies was fairly high, and then the 
theories of harm — foreclosure, raising rivals’ costs, 
and things like that — were fairly hard to prove.  So 
against the efficiency motivation and the difficulty 
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of showing clear incentive and ability to foreclose, 
there wasn’t a lot of incentive to bring cases. 
I think that what has happened is there has 
been some development in the machinery of analyzing 
vertical mergers.  Now we have vertical GUPPI 
analysis, upward pricing pressure analyses that are 
moved into the vertical context of the kind that Steve 
Salop has developed, and bargaining theory, bringing 
Nash bargaining theory more to the forefront in 
thinking about vertical mergers — not just thinking 
about foreclosure, not just thinking about raising 
rivals’ costs, but thinking about ways in which the 
threat point in a bargaining negotiation between the 
acquired firm in the hands of the acquiring firm, or 
vice versa, will change after the two are combined.  
That was obviously the theory that the 
government brought the AT&T/Time Warner case on. 
I think that actually is something a little 
different than just a remedial motivation; there is 
also some shift in the theory.  When you see a shift 
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in theory or an expansion in the number of theories 
that might generate a theory of harm in a case, you 
are likely to see more cases. 
I actually think that vertical mergers are 
going to be — we are not going to see a sea change, 
but I think one should not be so presumptively 
assuming that these are going to go through. 
I would just note when Makan Delrahim before 
he was Assistant Attorney General was asked about 
AT&T/Time Warner, he said, “Well yeah, it’s vertical.”  
But then when he got into the job and was focusing on 
the facts and got deep into the investigation, he 
began to see something else clearly in authorizing the 
case.  So I think that we will see more cases. 
MS. FEINSTEIN:  John, one of the debates in 
the United States is whether or not we should have 
Vertical Merger Guidelines.  They existed back in the 
1984 Guidelines.  They have never been updated.  There 
have been speeches by enforcers laying out the basic 
theories — incentive and ability to foreclose, the 
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bargaining model — that explain vertical foreclosure 
theory in two or three pages.   
The European Commission has obviously gone 
further and done much more detailed Guidelines.  Are 
the Guidelines useful or do they raise as many 
questions as they answer, such that simply saying, 
“Here are the three theories that might raise vertical 
issues” would give you as much guidance as you think 
would be useful in helping advise clients? 
MR. DAVIES: I think they have been very 
useful.  They certainly set the debate and you have a 
clear understanding of the way in which the European 
Commission will set about examining a case.   
We’re all very familiar with the question of 
ability to foreclose, incentive, and then the overall 
assessment of effect on competition. 
I think in my experience, acting both for 
notifying parties in vertical mergers and quite 
recently acting for a party bringing a complaint, is 
that frankly, notwithstanding the framework, you never 
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quite know what the outcome is going to be.  By which 
I mean I think it is very difficult for the agency to 
come to a conclusion and it is very difficult for the 
notifying parties to know how much risk they have. 
For me it centers around the question: What 
do we mean by foreclosure?  At what point does an 
impact on competition become anticompetitive 
foreclosure? 
So we have the framework, but we still have 
a very difficult judgment to make.  I think that’s 
probably the reason why in the European Union we see 
very often conduct remedies being agreed, particularly 
in Phase I merger cases, as a way to resolve the 
matter. 
I would say that clearly people would think 
Conduct remedies are a lot better than divestment.  
But in practice, as you indicated, they can be 
challenging, complicated to negotiate, particularly if 
there is a third party that’s very actively seeking to 
protect its position. 
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And, of course, they often lead to long-term 
monitoring.  We see that in Qualcomm/NXP, where the 
Commission sought a range of remedies.  One licensing 
remedy would last for eight years. 
The last thing I’d say is I think it’s 
important to recognize there is in practice a very 
important difference between the U.S. approach and the 
EU approach.  The European Commission has to make sure 
that it can survive an appeal to the court.  The U.S. 
agencies don’t have to worry about that in the same 
way.  Very often we find ourselves being put to task — 
appropriately — by Carles and his colleagues to make 
sure that they have the necessary information in the 
filing, for example, to clear a case.  So that can be 
a very onerous processes. 
MS. FEINSTEIN:  Carles, I’ve heard you say 
before that the European Commission has a preference 
for structural remedies even in vertical cases but you 
will take conduct remedies when they are appropriate.  
So a couple of questions.  Do you have the 
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sense that the conduct remedies you have taken have 
been successful and workable?  Is there guidance you 
can give on when you might consider a conduct remedy 
rather than a structural remedy in a vertical case? 
MR. ESTEVA:  Our preference for structural 
remedies goes across the board both for horizontal and 
vertical cases.  Our practice shows that in a number 
of cases with vertical concerns divestitures have been 
the best solution, certainly in mergers where we have 
vertical and horizontal concerns in the same case.  
But also in a number of cases where there was only a 
vertical issue that could be solved by a divestiture 
without necessarily affecting the rationale or the 
efficiencies in the case, then we went for a 
divestiture. 
But our Guidelines also say that if you have 
a conduct or a behavioral remedy that can have the 
same effects as a structural one that can be 
implemented effectively, properly monitored, and that 
will allow another player to remain in the market or 
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to enter into the market — that is, that it is not 
simply a promise to behave in a certain way by the 
merged entities but it will have an impact on the 
structure of the market — it can be accepted. 
That’s why in a number of vertical cases you 
will see that we have solved them via access remedies 
or in conglomerate cases via interoperability remedies 
that basically achieve the same. 
It is important, when looking at these types 
of solutions, to examine how the industry is working.  
If you see that in the industry in question companies 
are already protecting themselves from risks of 
foreclosure through long-term contracts, I don’t think 
there is any problem with an authority replicating 
this either by ensuring that the parties will 
renegotiate their existing contracts with companies at 
risk of being foreclosed or adding on top of it a 
conduct remedy that guarantees access. This is the 
strategy that we have followed in a number of cases. 
Talking about AT&T, we have also applied 
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similar theories of harm in a number of mergers 
leading to integration between content and telecoms 
providers. A case that we had recently in Belgium, 
Telenet/De Vijver, is a good example of this approach. 
MS. FEINSTEIN:  Bruce, what’s your 
perspective?  I know you said the same thing, that you 
prefer structural remedies.  There was a case and the 
discussion in the United States about why you used a 
conduct remedy in that case, and I’d like you to talk 
about that for a minute.  But also I can think of a 
number of cases, like Pepsi and Coke buying their 
bottlers, where the remedy was to ensure that there 
was an appropriate firewall.  Those were not cases 
that could have been resolved by divestiture because 
the divestiture would have been of the very assets 
they were buying.  So are we going to see cases like 
that with no remedy, or are we going to see going to 
court way, way, way more on vertical cases to deal 
with all those cases that in the past have been 
remedied by conduct remedies? 
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MR. HOFFMAN:  I hate to say “way, way, way 
more” because, as I mentioned earlier, we are talking 
about relatively small numbers here in the sense that 
vertical mergers where we conclude that there is a 
competitive problem that needs to be remedied are 
still fewer than horizontal mergers where we reach 
that conclusion for the reasons that everybody 
mentioned earlier.  I spoke about this previously so I 
won’t go into great detail on it. 
On these larger questions, also I want to 
put in a plug for the hearings that we have coming up.  
We actually have a hearing on vertical mergers coming 
up in the near future, I guess a couple weeks from 
now.  We are looking for comments, if people want to 
provide comments to us.  I want to underscore that we 
are going to take comments very seriously.  We are 
really looking for input on all of these questions.  
So things may change as we go forward here.  That’s 
actually the purpose of having hearings on these 
issues. 
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But more broadly in terms of vertical 
mergers and remedies, I’ve said previously, consistent 
with what Carles has said, that we prefer structural 
remedies.  That is so for the simple reason that 
structural remedies change incentives whereas 
behavioral remedies change abilities.  Those are very 
different things.  If you change incentives, then you 
don’t have to worry anymore about whether people are 
going to find some way to act on their incentives — 
the incentive is gone.  If you are just imposing 
remedies that affect people’s ability to act on their 
incentives, then you have to worry perpetually about 
whether they will find some way to get around the 
remedy you put in place and act on those incentives.  
So there is an inherent difference in enforceability. 
Having said all that, we had a remedies 
study, as you know, and the remedies study looked at, 
I think, four vertical merger remedies and concluded 
that all of them had actually worked.   
We have a recent vertical merger remedy that 
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is a behavioral remedy, I guess, that’s nonstructural, 
and I guess you could say that provides really good 
precedent the next time you have a transaction in 
which the customer is the Department of Defense and 
the product market is missiles, and beyond that it 
probably doesn’t do you a lot of good.  But I think it 
does show that in cases where the vertical merger 
creates some real benefits, you can’t attain the 
benefits with a divestiture, with some kind of 
structural remedy, and we have reasonable confidence 
that whatever behavioral remedy we put in place would 
actually work and be something we could actually do, 
we certainly haven’t ruled that out. 
MS. FEINSTEIN:  Terrific. 
Switching gears just slightly, the European 
Commission, John, sometimes talks about conglomerate 
effects.  Can you talk about how that differs from 
traditional vertical theories and your perspectives on 
advising clients about conglomerate effects in Europe? 
MR. DAVIES:  Thanks, Debbie. 
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Talking to a large U.S. audience on the 
issue of conglomerate effects is a risky venture.  
Unfortunately, I drew the short straw.  So please bear 
with me. 
We’re talking here about mergers between 
companies that have complementary products in 
neighboring markets where through a range of possible 
practices — tying, bundling, or other exclusionary 
actions — there can be a material foreclosure effect. 
I’ve heard Americans say, “There is no 
theory of harm,” and I have to say I disagree with 
that.  The EU Guidelines set out what the theory is.  
For me the real issue is predictability and how 
prepared the agencies are to look further down the 
road from an immediate potential efficiency through 
bundling, which might reduce prices, to a potential 
marginalization of competitors — of course, that’s 
what GE/Honeywell was all about — and in my experience 
the U.S. agencies are much less willing to look 
further down the road, whereas the European Union will 
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be prepared to seek to balance out effects over time. 
I can say from recent activity U.S. 
corporations are very happy to engage with the 
European Commission on the conglomerate theory of harm 
in relation to other people’s mergers where they can 
see that they might be affected over time.  This 
predictability issue and the question of standard of 
proof in relation to foreclosure is very challenging, 
but I don’t accept the idea that there is not a theory 
of harm. 
A little bit of history.  I mentioned 
GE/Honeywell.  Very little happened for a number of 
years in the EU arena after that.  Then the 2008 
Guidelines set out the theory of harm.  But again, 
there was little activity.   
James in his introduction mentioned the 
expression “portfolio effects” as if that was some 
kind of evil spirit that he raised.  But I would say 
to you that there has been a resurgence again of EU 
activity in this area.  There have been probably at 
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least half-a-dozen cases in the last couple of years 
involving a range of different markets — Dentsply in 
relation to dental markets; Worldline/Equens in the 
financial markets; a major Phase II case, 
Essilor/Luxottica, which was ultimately resolved 
without issues but was a major exercise for the 
European Commission; and Qualcomm/NXP also had 
conglomerate issues in it. 
So I would say that there has been a 
resurgence.  Indeed, I can quote from the Commission’s 
own Competition Merger Brief of July in relation to 
Qualcomm, where the Commission said, or at least the 
Commission officials who wrote the piece said: “When 
reviewing transactions combining complementary 
products in highly technological sectors, the 
Commission does not shy away from carrying out 
conglomerate assessment.  Conglomerate mergers may 
warrant careful scrutiny, particularly when the 
Parties hold significant market positions in relation 
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to complementary products.”1 
Now, having said that, I probably need a 
bodyguard to be taken out of the room here because I’m 
sure that a number of American listeners aren’t so 
happy about that. 
I would say the issue is alive and well.  
For me the challenge for the Commission goes back to 
the point I made in relation to vertical mergers: How 
do you resolve the issue, and is there a way that you 
could possible filter the cases more quickly? 
In the United States I know that the 
relevant investigating team can very quickly dismiss a 
conglomerate issue without any further analysis.  I 
don’t think we’ll ever get to that point in the 
European Union.   
But I do feel that there must be some scope 
for avoiding the burden of time and cost that, for 
example, parties like Essilor/Luxottica are put 
through, where I think the evidence was obtained from 
                                                 
1 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cmb/2018/kdal18001enn.pdf  
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4000 retail opticians.  I think there has to be a 
means to filter those cases so that there are fewer 
situations where companies feel, particularly at the 
end of Phase I, that they are obliged to come up with 
some kind of remedy, again which is likely to be a 
behavioral remedy, in order to be able to move on with 
their transaction. 
MS. FEINSTEIN:  In the United States I know 
that often when companies want to complain about 
conglomerate types of theories the agencies will say, 
“Look, if there is illegal bundling or illegal tying 
come to us after the merger and we can remedy that as 
a conduct matter.  We don’t want to block a merger 
simply because the company might do that with multiple 
products when there’s no real evidence that they 
would.” 
I can honestly say that I don’t believe I 
heard the word “conglomerate” in the four years that I 
was at the Agency as a theory that anybody wanted to 
pursue.  I don’t know, Howard or Bruce, if you want to 
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offer perspectives from your time at the Agency as to 
whether or not that was an issue and something that 
the United States should be thinking about more. 
MR. SHELANSKI:  I’ll pass it to you and then 
I can follow up. 
MR. HOFFMAN:  Okay.  So I’ve been 
volunteered to take the first swing at this from the 
U.S. perspective. 
I think there’s a couple of things.  First 
of all, with respect to pure conglomerate theories, if 
you think about product extension or things like that, 
we’ve been there and done that.  We had FTC v. Procter 
& Gamble.  There’s a history of cases — and this is to 
some extent where the United States has the luxury of 
having done this for a really long time so we’ve made 
every mistake in the book. 
We had a series of cases that involved these 
theories, which have been roundly pilloried in the 
subsequent academic literature as having basically all 
been completely wrong.  So we went down this path, and 
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then the professors told us we were wrong, and the 
courts then said, “We agree with the professors and 
you guys were wrong.”  So we didn’t tend to go down 
this specific route. 
But when you get into what today is called 
“conglomerate effects,” I think there’s a couple of 
things. 
First of all, a lot of what people call 
“conglomerate” I would actually call “vertical,” or 
even in some cases “horizontal” or “potential 
competition” type theories.  We really do look at 
those kinds of things.  
That then leaves a fairly small bucket of 
what you might think of as true conglomerate effects 
that really aren’t vertical and really horizontal, and 
then the problem that you run into is most of those 
actually look like procompetitive benefits.  They tend 
to look like the merged firm will be a more efficient 
competitor, or it will have a lower cost of capital, 
or it will have better efficiencies, or it will have 
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better bargaining power as opposed to leverage.  So 
there’s a lot of things where it is very difficult ex 
ante to say “this is bad versus good” and a lot of the 
things that are left look good. 
Then that gets to the point, Debbie, that 
you made, and to go back to something I said earlier.  
One of the things that we think about a lot in merger 
enforcement is merger enforcement, particularly when 
you are stopping mergers before they have been 
consummated, is aimed at preventing firms from getting 
into a position where they could cause anticompetitive 
harm in a way that it would be very difficult to do 
anything about.  Coordinated interaction is not a 
Section 1 issue typically, as just one example. 
That’s not true for these kinds of theories.  
These kinds of theories, as mentioned earlier — 
bundling, tying, those sorts of things — if in fact 
they are done and in fact they are anticompetitive, we 
can reach under Sherman 1, Sherman 2, and the FTC Act. 
Also, if you go back and you look at Michael 
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Whinston or other literature on this, it’s true that 
you could show bundling can be anticompetitive and 
tying can be anticompetitive and so forth — that’s 
absolutely true — but there have to be a lot of 
conditions that have to be met for those things to be 
true.   
So when you’re looking at it ex ante and 
you’re saying, “Okay, do I have real confidence that I 
can demonstrate that all the conditions required for 
this to be anticompetitive are going to exist at the 
point in time when the merged firm will have the 
ability to act on it as opposed to these other 
potential procompetitive benefits?” — that’s a very 
tough call to make ex ante and one that where we do 
have tools to do it ex post it is much more 
challenging to do. 
MR. SHELANSKI:  I’m glad I ducked and let 
Debbie’s question hit Bruce because I agree 
completely.  I think that was a great answer. 
I don’t think I ever heard the term 
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“conglomerate effect” or “conglomerate merger” in my 
time at the Agency.  That wasn’t a label that people 
put on a theory of harm or a reason that we should 
investigate.   
What you did hear were some of the things 
Bruce talked about: potential competition; or that the 
product market might change, that what might have been 
products that were sold in partial lines would now be 
pulled into full lines of complementary products — 
getting back to what John was saying about 
complementary product mergers. 
Now, just for ease of convenience for the 
ability to price lower and without great theories yet 
in the market — at least when I was at the Agency; 
there are some now — but for judges to avail 
themselves of to come after the bundlers, there was 
some concern that what you were really creating was a 
full line as a product and that partial-line 
competitors wouldn’t be able to come in against them.  
That wasn’t really labeled “conglomerate” at the time. 
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Now that we’ve got Dentsply, we’ve got 
Cascade/PeaceHealth, we have other ways of thinking 
about bundling, I do think you can go after those 
cases under Section 1 and Section 2, but I think that 
conglomerate effects relabeled might get at a number 
of things that we do recognize here in the United 
States and that it’s not quite as alien as some make 
it out to be. 
MS. FEINSTEIN:  And perhaps because of our 
system where we have to go into court to prove a case 
and where the law on bundling is a bit unclear, I 
think probably the parties are more likely to be able 
to engage in something that may raise these concerns 
where the law is a little unclear and that could be a 
reason why you are less likely to see this brought in 
the United States than you are in Europe, even if 
there is perhaps some concern that the company might 
engage in tying or bundling. 
Carles, you have been very gracious to come 
across the ocean.  If you’d like to say something on 
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conglomerate mergers you’re welcome to, but I’m not 
going to put you on the spot if you don’t want to 
engage in the debate and defend the position. 
MR. ESTEVA:  Let me react.  I’d like to make 
three different points. 
First, let me give you some figures on our 
enforcement to put this into the proper context.  I 
have detailed figures for the last three years, 
actually three and a half years because they go until 
the end of August of this year. In this period we have 
intervened in eighty-six merger cases, in which we 
have identified anticompetitive concerns; of these 
only in thirteen cases we have raised non-horizontal 
issues; and of these five were conglomerate cases, 
mergers between complementary products that led to 
foreclosure theories. In all of them we applied our 
now well established assessment framework, described 
in our non-horizontal guidelines from 2008. 
What type of issues did these five cases 
raise?  Mostly they raised risk of foreclosure through 
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what we could call technical tying.  Dentsply/Sirona 
is a good example: you have a company that has a very 
strong position in dental chairs and is acquiring a 
supplier of complementary medical equipment; the risk 
is that in the future these dental chairs will not 
remain interoperable with other medical equipment.  
For these cases an interoperability remedy doesn’t 
prevent technical integration; it simply ensures that 
the company will maintain the same practice that it 
had premerger, that is to allow other competitors to 
interoperate. 
We could challenge this behavior under 
Article 102 ex post, certainly we could, but sometimes 
it might be too late to preserve the position of 
competitors.  Merger control is there to do an ex ante 
analysis and to avoid anticompetitive outcomes. 
Second, when we are discussing differences 
among us, I think it is always useful not only to look 
at substantive law but also at the institutional 
system.  John made a comment that I share.   
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Probably our most clear institutional 
difference is that in the United States agencies go to 
court when they want to challenge a merger, but when 
they decide not to challenge there is no such judicial 
redress, or it is much more complicated; while on our 
side every decision that we take, either prohibiting 
or clearing, can be appealed. 
In the EU there are appeals by third parties 
arguing that the Commission did not justify why there 
weren't non-horizontal concerns, like in Liberty/Ziggo 
where the court concluded the Commission had not 
properly justified why one possible foreclosure theory 
in one submarket would not arise.  When you are 
confronted with this, authorities do not have the 
luxury to say, “Well, the evolution in this market is 
too uncertain in the future.”  We need to come with 
arguments of why the market will evolve in a way that 
would lead to foreclosure or non-foreclosure, of the 
most likely outcome.  This institutional setting 
ensures a balanced approach by the EU authorities and   
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can also contribute to explain some of the differences 
across the Atlantic. 
Third, we need to put these differences into 
context. Let me come back to the figures that I 
mentioned before.  All the issues that we are 
discussing at this panel are at the margins of 
enforcement. At the EU we had four cases on 
coordinated effects, thirteen cases of non-horizontal 
concerns, but the bulk of our enforcement on both 
sides of the Atlantic is on unilateral aspects, on 
short-term impact on prices, on ensuring that we have 
remedies that eliminate these concerns. 
The fact that this panel doesn’t feel the 
need to discuss all these issues shows that on most of 
the fronts we have a broad consensus.  The message 
today I don’t think should be that we have a 
disagreement on conglomerate issues but rather that 
there is so much agreement on all the rest that we 
don’t even feel the need to discuss it. 
MR. HOFFMAN:  I ran the numbers.  Your 
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number is 5.8 percent of your enforcement actions 
involve conglomerate — that’s pretty small — and 94.2 
percent didn’t. 
MS. FEINSTEIN:  But these are the issues 
that often get discussed in board rooms and elsewhere 
-- whether or not there is convergence or divergence. 
Speaking about another term that hasn’t come 
up as much in the past but has suddenly been discussed 
a lot, particularly in the popular press is monopsony, 
particularly in labor markets but more generally. 
Bruce, I wonder if you could start us off by 
describing monopsony and explaining the debate between 
whether or not it is the symmetrical opposite of 
monopoly. 
MR. HOFFMAN:  This is a pet topic of mine so 
I’m going to have to restrain myself from going on 
indefinitely here, as you know.  We talked about this 
a few times. 
Monopsony involves the exercise of buying 
power, market power by a buyer that results in an 
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output reduction so the buyer purchases less than the 
socially optimal or the economically optimal output 
from its upstream suppliers.  That’s a complicated way 
of describing it, but it’s actually really important 
for a reason I’ll get back to in a second, because 
there’s a huge confusion in the popular press about 
what is monopsony versus what is buyer power. 
Legally I think it’s quite clear that 
monopoly and monopsony are symmetrical.  The caselaw 
and the Guidelines actually are quite clear that there 
is no distinction in how the courts or how the 
enforcement agencies view the legality of conduct or 
transactions that result in monopsony versus monopoly 
power.  
Now, I don’t think that’s actually 
necessarily true from an economic standpoint.  There 
are a couple of differences between monopoly and 
monopsony that could have implications for how you 
actually would allege a case, for example, of what you 
might look for. 
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One is monopoly cases involve the demand 
curve primarily, and we think and there is good reason 
to believe that demand curves are virtually always 
downward-sloping, with the exception of Giffen goods 
or Veblen goods, which are really outliers and not 
really material for the purposes of most enforcement 
decisions.  I can talk about those things if people 
really want to get into it, but I’ll skip it for now, 
unless somebody has a desire to delve into really 
arcane things. 
In order for monopsony to exist — there’s a 
bargaining theory of monopsony that doesn’t require 
this condition; it’s a little more complicated — but 
in the standard monopsony theory you have to assume 
that supply curves are upward-sloping.  We don’t know 
as a matter of theory or empirics whether that is as 
uniformly true as is the case with demand curves. 
There’s a number of supply curves that you 
might think would be flat.  There’s some that could be 
downward-sloping — for example, where you have returns 
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of scale or efficiencies, lower cost of production, 
you actually might have a downward-sloping supply 
curve.  Labor supply curves are arguably U-shaped.  So 
the theoretical framework in economics for treating 
monopoly and monopsony as symmetrical is not as robust 
as the legal framework is. 
Having said all that, I think it’s certainly 
the case that this is an issue that we are thinking 
about a lot. 
One other point that I wanted to touch on in 
the popular press is there is a confusion between 
buyer power and monopsony power, but I think it’s 
actually relatively easy to resolve.  The popular 
press hasn’t done this, but it’s easy to resolve if 
you think about it this way.  When you have a concern 
about a possible exercise of buyer power, the critical 
question or the first question you can ask is: What 
are the suppliers going to do?   
When the buyer exercises his power, 
typically in the first instance by reducing the price 
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it is going to pay, then you say: Will supplier A say, 
“That price isn’t very good so I’m going to actually 
produce less because it’s not worth it to me to 
continue producing as much as I’m producing; or am I 
going to produce more because I want to get that 
revenue back, and so in order to get the same amount 
of revenue I’m just going to increase my output?” 
If the answer is you are going to produce 
more, then you probably have a procompetitive, or at 
least neutral, situation where, for example, 
effectively the buyer’s price cut might really be the 
equivalent of volume discounts; or it could be 
offsetting existing market power on the supplier side.  
There has been some empirical work on 
insurance mergers, for example, where the post-merger 
insurance company reduced price for healthcare 
providers — this is health insurance — and the 
response of the providers was typically to increase 
their output, which suggests that in those cases there 
was preexisting market power by the healthcare 
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providers that the merged insurance company offset. 
On the other hand, if the suppliers cut 
their production, if it becomes not valuable enough 
for them to make those next units under the new 
pricing conditions, then you have a monopsony problem, 
and there is no reason why we wouldn’t try to deal 
with that. 
Now, as a practical matter — I don’t think 
this is a necessary condition but it’s a very common 
condition — in order for there to be demonstrable harm 
from monopsony you also typically have power on the 
sell side, so the firm with the monopsony power also 
has some measure of monopoly or market power.  In a 
lot of our cases what has happened is we have 
determined that we can remedy that and by doing so we 
also fix the problem on the buy side.   
You could question — and I have questioned 
and others have questioned — how true that always is, 
but certainly that has been the case in a lot of our 
thinking about this in the past. 
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MS. FEINSTEIN:  Carles and John, do you see 
monopsony cases in Europe and do you have a sense of 
why not if you don’t? 
MR. ESTEVA:  This is an area where we have 
very limited case law and very little practice.  It is 
area where European merger law can still evolve. 
There is no doubt that the Merger Regulation 
would allow us also to look at the impact of mergers 
on the upstream markets if the merger leads to the 
creation of a monopsony.  Where there is less 
certainty is under which conditions the Commission 
should intervene. 
We have looked at this issue in a number of 
cases normally affecting mergers between supermarkets.  
We have never concluded that these mergers would have 
led to sufficient market power upstream to be 
concerned. 
We had recently an interesting case 
concerning a merger of slaughterhouses in Ireland. The 
market downstream is the sale of meat across Ireland, 
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while the market upstream is basically the acquisition 
of live cattle in narrower geographical areas. The 
concern was: would this entity after the merger be 
able to lower prices to acquire cattle? 
We concluded that even if the merger entity 
would have a quite important market share on the 
acquisition of cattle, around 40 percent, it would not 
be able to lower prices because other slaughterhouses 
remain there with excess capacity that could be used 
to acquire. 
But if we had found that they could lower 
prices, would that be enough to intervene?  I think 
the general wisdom in Europe is that probably this is 
not enough, that it’s not enough to say simply because 
prices upstream will be lower you have a competition 
concern. 
We would probably need to establish that 
this price reduction would have an impact on the 
market in a way that output would be reduced and 
finally customers would be harmed.   
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But I say all this with all the safeguards 
needed because we have never had to establish this in 
a case and we have never gone to court on this matter.   
MR. SHELANSKI:  I don’t have a lot to add to 
this discussion.  I would just note that I think the 
key distinction that drives why there was not much 
attention in the popular press in the 1980s and why 
there might be attention now is the distinction 
between buyer power and monopsony. 
I think a lot of what we hear about — 
particularly with regard to wages, as you mentioned, 
Debbie — is about buyer power and reallocation of 
surplus from workers to the owners of capital.  It is 
not about inefficient reduction of supply under the 
traditional monopsony kind of model.  So I think it 
taps into a lot of things that have a lot greater 
resonance to people than the fact that supply curves 
are presumed upward-sloping and if you price too low 
people won’t find it profitable to produce the next 
increment so they won’t. 
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We haven’t seen a lot of monopsony cases 
over the past century for a good reason.  That’s very 
often a self-correcting kind of situation because as a 
buyer of that output you don’t want to sub-optimally 
consume what you need, especially if it’s an input 
market — and this often comes up in agriculture — so 
you are going to raise your price just to the level 
that you need to to get that level of output. 
The antitrust authorities look at this and 
say, “Well, this is great.  This is just squeezing 
down costs, which expands ultimate product output to 
consumers.  This is a good thing.” 
So monopsony has a redistributive effect 
that comes through some of the efficiencies that often 
prevent us us from bringing monopsony cases.  So it’s 
really bargaining power that I think is driving a lot 
of the current debate.   
It’s a very important topic.  Whether it’s 
an antitrust topic I think is a harder question. 
MS. FEINSTEIN:  Yes.  I think Howard made a 
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really important point. At another conference there 
was an interesting discussion about is it enough just 
to have the condition of monopsony or is it self-
correcting?   
Most of the lawyers in the room said: “The 
way we think about the caselaw and the consumer 
welfare effect, we have to show not just that they 
would have few enough buyers that they could extract 
this; we have to show the next couple of steps, that 
in fact there would be reduced output as a result and 
prices to consumers would end up going up; otherwise 
all it’s doing is lowering cost.  And it’s something 
that the buyers can control so why should we worry 
about this?” 
There were a number of economists in the 
room that were adamant it should be exactly 
symmetrical and that simply if you can show that the 
conditions for monopoly exist because of a merger or 
the conditions of oligopoly, that the reverse ought to 
be true: simply the conditions of monopsony, the 
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conditions of oligopsony, that you shouldn’t have to 
take those next two steps.  
It will be interesting to see if there is 
the right kind of case that allows this to play out. 
I think we are nearing the end of our time.  
Unless anybody really wants to talk about common 
ownership, I think I might turn it over to the 
audience and ask both if there are questions.  And if 
the enforcers from any of the other countries want to 
weigh in with respect to perspectives from their 
jurisdiction, we would also welcome that.  I open the 
floor up. 
QUESTION [off-mic] [James Keyte, Fordham]: I 
have one for Bruce because it sounds like this is one 
of your pet areas for monopsony. 
QUESTIONER [off-mic] [Mr. Keyte]:  Bruce, in 
terms of a monopsony situation where you have a more 
competitive downstream market, is it your position 
that you would still have to show an effect on 
ultimate consumers, even where there is a monopsony 
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effect upstream? 
MR. HOFFMAN: I don’t know what a court would 
say about that.  I think that’s an issue that’s kind 
of out there waiting to be addressed. 
One thing I would say about that is if you 
truly have a monopsony, then even assuming the 
downstream market is competitive — and you’re not 
going to be able to show the sort of standard “Okay, 
I’ve got a monopsony on one side, a monopoly on the 
other, and I’m going to suppress output and suppress 
input,” which is the easy case — but assuming you 
don’t have that, nevertheless one of the effects that 
can occur in that kind of scenario — or take the 
slaughterhouse type scenario where you have the 
slaughterhouses but then the downstream market is the 
sale of beef; that’s more competitive — nevertheless 
you could assume that in most situations where that 
would occur the result would be that while there would 
be no reduction in output overall, the output would 
move to a less-efficient configuration because ex ante 
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the configuration would by assumption be the more-
efficient one; otherwise it wouldn’t exist.   
So there is a net efficiency loss in that 
scenario, and from my way of thinking about things, if 
that’s the case, I’m not worried about a false 
positive; I would consider bringing that case.  If a 
court were then to say, “Well, you haven’t been able 
to show enough downstream harm, then so be it, but the 
economics of that are I think fairly unambiguously 
harmful. 
QUESTIONER [off-mic] [Mr. Keyte]: And does 
that go to the debate of whether it’s consumer 
welfare, total welfare [inaudible]? 
MR. HOFFMAN:  Well, there’s consumer welfare 
loss there; it’s just that it’s very, very difficult 
to quantify.  In the monopoly context it’s easier.  
But in the scenario that I described you’ve got an 
inefficiency problem where I’ve now substituted a 
less-efficient input, so presumably that is going to 
cause an effect where everyone is worse off. 
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I’m not an economist at all; I just play 
around with this stuff and stay in — what is the old 
saying, “I slept at a Holiday Inn Express last night?” 
— so I hesitate to go too far down the road of 
addressing the total welfare-versus-consumer welfare 
framework in terms of how you would characterize that. 
But to me there is both a net loss and you 
would assume that some of that at least would be 
translated to the consumer level.  I just think it’s 
hard to quantify than is the case with the more 
classical “I have a monopsony problem and I have 
market power downstream.”  That one is easier. 
QUESTIONER [off-mic] [Mr. Keyte]: That will 
be an interesting case. 
MR. HOFFMAN:  Those are the best ones. 
QUESTION [Michael Stein]:  Speaking of 
things that are difficult to quantify from a harm 
perspective but might also be in the press a bit soon, 
do you think there has been any movement on predatory 
pricing?  Is that something we can see a renewed 
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interest in? 
MR. HOFFMAN:  Was that to me or is that to 
Carles?   
QUESTIONER [Mr. Stein]:  To anyone. 
MR. ESTEVA:  Can you repeat the question? 
QUESTIONER [Mr. Stein]:  Really the question 
is about predatory pricing, like the idea of pricing 
so low that you drive competitors out of business.  Up 
to a very fine line it’s generally pretty 
procompetitive.  It is a topic that has been in the 
press lately here. 
MS. FEINSTEIN:  We have a Supreme Court case 
that lays out pretty clearly what the standards are 
for predatory pricing cases.  I think that’s the way 
the agencies and private plaintiffs will think about 
it.  I don’t think there’s a lot of room for change 
there any time soon. 
MR. HOFFMAN:  I agree. 
MR. ESTEVA:  We have also a pretty clear 
legal situation in Europe on this. 
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QUESTION [Pallavi Guniganti]:  I have a 
question following up on the comments from the head of 
the French Competition Authority yesterday about the 
incoming legislation in France for agricultural 
producers and their interactions with food retailers. 
With the concern that was shown by the 
legislature there about how forcing down prices on 
food producers was potentially hurting quality — and 
that’s presumably from a competition aspect also a 
relevant part of consumer welfare — I was curious as 
to how that is seen with the monopsony situation. 
MR. HOFFMAN:  What I would say about that is 
when we say “price” we mean that as a shorthand for 
price/quality/output.  We would certainly be concerned 
about a monopsony case where the exercise of monopsony 
power took the form of driving down quality.  That’s 
the case as well on the other side when we’re looking 
at standard monopoly-type or selling-side cases where 
we try to look at quality. 
It’s inherently harder to measure so there 
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are more challenging issues that arise when you are 
trying to assess those kinds of effects.  But we 
certainly would be open to that. 
MS. FEINSTEIN:  And I think it raises the 
same questions that Howard raised, which is if you’re 
the purchaser are you going to pay so little that you 
are going to drive down the quality; and, if so, why 
would you do so?  And, if there was then room for 
somebody with a higher-quality product, are the 
conditions for entry such that they couldn’t enter, 
and say: “Wait a minute.  There are people who are 
paying less but they’re getting a really bad product.  
Why don’t I basically come in with a slightly higher 
priced product but with better quality, if there in 
fact is a market for that?” 
MR. SHELANSKI:  I agree with this, although 
I think there is an important caveat, which is it’s 
not just that quality is harder to measure; very 
closely related to that is that it can be harder to 
observe.  There are things that are done in the 
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production process that reduce quality, reduce 
healthfulness.  This is part of the legislative 
concern that we have seen in a number of 
jurisdictions.  
That’s not going to be observable by 
consumers.  They are going to pay their price, they 
are going to get whatever the product is that they’re 
getting, and they may not know that there are things 
that have gone into the production of that product 
that are less healthy, that actually do reduce the 
quality, in ways that are hard to observe or that are 
observable only after a very long term. 
So what you get there is an effort to 
correct what is a potential market failure in the 
inability to let price be a sufficient statistic for 
everything that you want to know about what you are 
consuming.  There is a very coherent theory behind 
doing that kind of legislation. 
The only important thing to recognize is, 
though, if the market structure is static and you give 
 71 
 
 
 
 
Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.       
that larger payment to the people who are producing, 
why would they not still take the same shortcuts if 
the quality is unobservable?  That’s the hard question 
that has to be answered.  It has to be coupled with 
some kind of quality monitoring. 
MR. DAVIES:  If I could just add, I think in 
the agricultural area that would just open an 
extraordinary Pandora’s Box in terms of assessing 
quality.  I imagine a number of agency heads in the 
room would not particularly welcome that task.  I 
certainly wouldn’t welcome it from the other side of 
the table. 
QUESTION [Cecile Lohrs]: Thanks very much 
for coming and taking my question. 
I attended the Time Warner trial every day.  
I thought it was really interesting that DOJ’s 
economist acknowledged that there would be no 
foreclosure after the merger happened.  The whole 
theory of harm was based on the fact that there would 
be a slight increase in leverage, in bargaining, on 
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the Time Warner side, but they have never gone dark in 
the past with any of the companies who they negotiate 
with.   
I’m wondering what kind of proof you might 
need to make such a big jump from foreclosure always 
being the problem to being now the problem is this 
amorphous bargaining leverage issue.  You’re wrinkling 
your forehead, Bruce. 
MR. HOFFMAN:  I don’t think it’s very 
amorphous.  I think the bargaining theories are very 
clear. 
Think about it this way.  You don’t have to 
have a war for the threat of war to have an effect, 
right? 
QUESTIONER [Ms. Lohrs]: Absolutely. 
MR. HOFFMAN:  And so when you look at 
bargaining leverage models, what those models do is 
they say: Okay, how do the payoffs to the two sides 
change based on the outcome if everything goes bad? 
It is obviously going to be in the parties’ 
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interest to not have everything go bad, because then 
everybody suffers and the only question is who suffers 
worse. 
When a merger changes that dynamic, then you 
have a very predictable — it’s harder to show what the 
actual effect is going to be, but directionally you’ve 
got a very predictable change in the likely outcomes.  
I don’t think there’s anything 
controversial, or even particularly novel, at this 
point.  Ten years ago maybe this was a little more 
novel, but today to treat this as novel or something 
unprecedented or say that actual total breakdowns of 
bargaining are a necessary condition for this theory 
to be valid I think is just not correct. 
QUESTIONER [Ms. Lohrs]:  So what kind of 
evidence do you actually need?  Clearly I’m not the 
judge, but I was there and I was listening.  I’m 
wondering about what kind of evidence you would 
actually need. 
MR. HOFFMAN:  I should say that was a DOJ 
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case and I don’t want to speak for their cases. 
But what I would say is what you look for is 
how do the different participants in the bargaining 
view the outcome if things go wrong and how do they 
think about the likely change.  There are mathematical 
tools you can apply to that, but also you can look at 
what has happened in the past, what documents show, 
and those sorts of things.  I think showing that the 
transaction is going to change those payoffs and is 
going to change bargaining leverage is and should be 
enough. 
Of course it is helpful if you can show that 
at times in the past things have broken down, but I 
don’t think it’s necessary. 
MS. FEINSTEIN:  On that note, I want to 
thank the panelists for a great discussion.  Please 
join me in thanking them. 
MR. KEYTE:  Thank you very much. 
[Break: 12:15 p.m.] 
